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Understanding feelings: engaging with unconscious communication and embodied 
knowledge 
 
Abstract 
The field of emotional geographies raises challenging methodological questions about how 
researchers produce knowledge about the feelings of others. Countering scepticism about 
the methodological possibilities of psychoanalysis I argue for and illustrate its potential. 
Drawing on a single research interview, I show how psychoanalytic ideas about unconscious 
communication can be used to help to make sense of emotional dimensions of research 
interviews and the narratives they generate. I introduce the idea of the “receptive 
unconscious”, which I connect with the building of trust and the concept of rapport. Turning to 
transference communications, I clarify the different ways in which researchers and clinicians 
work with unconscious communications. I revisit debates about empathy, which I distinguish 
from identification and link to the counter-transference. I show how my embodied, affective 
response during and after the interview gave me clues that eventually furthered my 
understanding of emotional dimensions of the interviewee’s narrative. This analysis 
contributes to methodological debates about researching emotional geographies and to 
discussions of the methodological uses of psychoanalysis in social research. Rather than 
construing psychoanalytical methodologies as highly specialist and intrinsically different from 
generic qualitative research practice, it seeks to illustrate their potential in relation to critical 
forms of reflexivity well-attuned to understanding felt experience. 
 
Key Words: psychoanalysis, unconscious, embodied knowledge, emotion, feelings, 
interviews  
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Understanding feelings: engaging with unconscious communication and embodied 
knowledge 
 
Introduction 
How is it possible to know how another person feels? Researchers interested in emotional 
geographies as a terrain that engages with people’s subjective experience necessarily face 
this question. We know very well that what people say they feel bears a complex and 
problematic relationship to their embodied subjective experiences. There is an inevitable 
inarticulacy to feelings, which is lost when they are described in words (Harrison 2007). 
Moreover, people’s accounts of their feelings are profoundly shaped by the conditions in 
which they are rendered or performed (McDowell 1992). And yet surely there is no better 
source of knowledge about people’s feelings than the people concerned (compare Hitchings 
2012)?  
This dilemma has generated a variety of methodological innovations, many of which 
seek to go beyond talk of feelings (Crang 2003; Davies and Dwyer 2007). These innovations 
have included occasional uses of psychoanalytic ideas (for example Bennett 2009; Blazek in 
press; Bingley 2003; Bondi 2003a, 2003b, 2005a; Burgess, Limb and Harrison 1988a, 
1988b; Healy 2010; Kingsbury 2010; Nast 2000; Pardy 2011; Pile 1991, 2010a; Proudfoot 
2010; Sibley 2003; Thomas 2007, 2011; Wilton 2003). However, the explicit use of 
psychoanalysis remains relatively rare and perhaps marginal within emotional geographies. 
In this paper I argue for the potential relevance of aspects of psychoanalytic thinking about 
unconscious communication for understanding people’s feelings relationally and for 
comprehending something of the affective tenor of their narratives. In so doing, I also extend 
ways of understanding the unconscious currently circulating in the field of psychoanalytic 
geographies. I develop my argument through discussion of a single research interview, which 
serves to illustrate some ways in which feelings are communicated non-verbally and non-
cognitively through interview encounters, and in relation to which I reflect on how researchers 
might use such unconscious forms of communication. Before turning to the interview and my 
analysis of how my interviewee communicated and I communicated (some of) our feelings to 
one another, I review methodological debates about psychoanalysis in and around the field 
of emotional geographies, identifying key challenges and difficulties I seek to address 
through this worked example. 
 
Psychoanalytic methodologies 
In a paper published more than two decades ago, Steve Pile (1991) argued for the relevance 
of psychoanalytic ideas to the practise of interpretive human geography. According to Pile 
(1991, 460), geographers have been much “interested in the archaeology of knowledge and 
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language” and it could only be a matter of time before we turned to psychoanalysis as “the 
archaeology of the mind” (Pile, 1991, 460). He focused specifically on parallels between 
psychoanalytic and research relationships, describing them both as inter-subjective scenes, 
in which participants are drawn into complex multi-layered alliances. He suggested that we 
might use psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious dynamics of transference and 
counter-transference to deepen and enrich the practise of qualitative methods. I address his 
challenge in this paper. 
Although Pile’s paper has been cited in many subsequent discussions of qualitative 
methods in human geography, researchers have not flocked to psychoanalytic ideas in the 
way that he envisaged. While renewed interest in psychoanalytic methodologies has become 
evident very recently, for example in a recent special issue of The Professional Geographer 
(Healy 2010; Kingsbury 2010; Proudfoot 2010; Pile 2010a; Thomas 2010), contributors have 
themselves acknowledged that “many geographers are sceptical about the value and viability 
of psychoanalytic methodology” (Kingsbury 2010, 519; also see Kingsbury 2009). I draw out 
and critically examine three strands of this scepticism, concerned with power relations, 
expertise and ways of knowing respectively. In relation to each I offer counter-arguments. 
First, despite Pile’s (1991) efforts to trace a shift within psychoanalysis away from an 
authoritarian view of the psychoanalytic relationship towards a much more egalitarian one, 
this was not sufficient to dispel a widespread view of psychoanalysis as a highly unequal 
enterprise in which patients are very vulnerable to abuses of power (Parr 1998). In relation to 
methodological debates, one of the most influential sources of the authoritarian view of the 
psychoanalytic relationship has been Ann Oakley’s (1981) critique of the power relations of 
traditional approaches to interviewing: for Oakley, the psychoanalytic interview epitomised 
the problem she sought to expose and challenge. Ensuing discussion of interviewing in and 
beyond human geography (especially among those informed by feminism) has expressed 
much concern regarding the risk of reproducing or reinforcing pre-existing social inequalities 
within the research process (England 1994; McDowell 1992; Moss 2006). Although 
psychoanalytic approaches are barely mentioned within these discussions, Oakley’s account 
is cited so frequently that at least implicitly her view of psychoanalysis remains unchallenged. 
In this context it is reasonable to infer that the dominant view of psychoanalytic approaches 
presumes them liable, or even likely, to constitute sophisticated methods for manipulating or 
subtly disempowering research subjects, or for doing violence to their stories.  
Perhaps most problematic for social researchers attentive to the power relations of 
research is the possibility that psychoanalytic approaches encourage researchers to lay 
claim to knowledge that remains unknown to their research participants. Such 
psychoanalytically-based knowledge claims are suggested in some contributions to the 
nascent field of psychosocial studies pioneered by social psychologists, including Wendy 
 5 
Hollway and Tony Jefferson (2000), Valerie Walkerdine and her colleagues (2001) and 
Simon Clarke and Paul Hoggett (2009). For example, in their classic text Doing Qualitative 
Research Differently, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) made extensive use of the 
psychoanalytic concept of unconscious defences, describing their research interviewees as 
“defended subjects”. Although they also emphasised the collaborative co-construction of 
narratives within interviews, to describe research participants as “defended subjects” implies 
that researchers know something about the personalities and emotional lives of research 
participants that the latter are unable to acknowledge themselves. While other contributions 
to psychosocial studies have problematised the self-knowledge of the researcher as much as 
that of their participants (for example Gadd 2004), the representation of research participants 
as “defended subjects” has tended to reinforce a dominant view of psychoanalytic 
approaches as likely to disempower participants and as failing to trouble the power dynamics 
of research. But, as Pile’s (1991) account sought to argue, the supposed authority of the 
(knowledge of the) psychoanalyst has been troubled within psychoanalysis.  In this context, 
my aim in this paper is modest: I seek to show how psychoanalytic ideas can be used to 
support the researcher’s use of reflexivity in ways that are sensitive to the power dynamics of 
interviews, that position researchers as witnesses rather than as authorities and that 
elaborate methodologically a relational approach to emotion for which I and others have 
argued (Bennett 2009; Bondi 2005a; Evans 2012). 
A second strand of scepticism arises from the status of psychoanalysis as a clinical 
practice, which has prompted unease about the competence of anyone without clinical 
training to use psychoanalytic methods (Bingley 2003; Oliver 2003). Discussing 
methodological approaches to studying emotion in social research, Janet Holland (2007) has 
presented the use of psychoanalytic methods as highly specialist and as requiring dedicated 
training. Holland equated psychoanalytic approaches with what has become known as 
psychosocial studies to which I have referred. Contributors to psychosocial studies concur 
with her view, and present their work as encompassing a distinctive methodological 
approach uniquely placed to explore the interface between psychology and sociology, 
including questions of emotion (for example Clarke and Hoggett 2009). Such claims do not 
encourage those without specialist training to explore psychosocial studies and it has not 
made much impact within emotional geographies.  
In these circumstances a continuing reluctance to engage with psychoanalytic 
methods is, perhaps, not surprising. However others have argued rather differently. For 
example Paul Kingsbury (2010, 520) has challenged the mystique that sometimes appears to 
accrue to psychoanalytic methods, and on his account psychoanalysis has already had a 
substantial but largely unacknowledged influence on a wide variety of methodological 
debates in human geography, rendering it “at once central yet marginal, influential yet 
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rebuffed”. He has sought to situate “psychoanalytic methodology beyond the couch” (ibid. 
520), tracing, for example, the spatialities of desire made available through the adoption (via 
Zizek 1989, 2006) of Lacan’s notion of the objet petit a (Kingsbury 2010, also see Kingsbury 
2003, 2009). Elsewhere I too have argued that at least some aspects of the psychoanalytic 
practice are simply refinements of ordinary social skills, which can be developed and 
deployed by those without clinical training (Bondi 2003a, 2005a). In this paper I develop that 
line of argument further, focussing specifically on matters of emotion as they are 
communicated unconsciously, and I suggest when and how researchers might usefully draw 
on others with clinical experience. 
Thirdly, Pile’s (1991) engagement with psychoanalytic ideas led him to call upon 
interviewers and interviewees to talk about what goes on between them, and to disclose their 
respective assumptions about each other. His exhortation to interviewers to “talk about it” 
with their interviewees (ibid., 465) implied a view of the unconscious as relatively easily and 
unproblematically knowable by subjects willing to engage in self-reflection. This appeal to 
open communication and self-reflexivity has since been subject to considerable and 
sustained criticism. Linda McDowell (1992, 408), for example, found Pile’s argument “highly 
dubious” and his representation of the interpersonal dynamics of research interviews as 
“idealized”, specifically in his assumption that researchers can create “safe and supportive” 
environments in which interviewees are enabled to “share their experiences and feelings” 
(Pile, 1991, 459). Gillian Rose (1997) added weight to this view in her critique of anything 
approximating to the kind of transparent self-reflexivity Pile advocated.  Criticisms also came 
from others engaging with psychoanalytic theory. For example, Felicity Callard (2003, 307) 
has drawn attention to a widespread tendency to neglect “the dark undertow of Freud’s 
writings”, including “his insistence of the refractory operations of the unconscious”, which 
militate against “narratives of efficacious subjective transformation”. Indeed, in his more 
recent writings Steve Pile (20101, 2010b, 2012) would seem to concur with this view of the 
unconscious as radically other, deeply disruptive, and certainly not available through self-
reflection. Thus, a key rationale for the psychoanalytic turn envisaged by Pile (1991) has 
fallen away, to be replaced by a different view of both psychoanalysis and the scope for self-
reflexive talk to generate valuable knowledge about the world.  
In relation to interviews and especially the narratives they generate, Mary Thomas 
(2007, 543) has argued that studies of subjectivity and identity need to take seriously 
psychoanalytic ideas about the unconscious, but that “psychoanalysis in social science 
research cannot extend into the practice of psychoanalyzing our research subjects”. This left 
her with a conundrum, positioning unconscious processes as central and yet reluctant to 
engage directly in any analysis of them. For Thomas (2007, 537) that which is unconscious is 
powerful and important, but intrinsically unknowable, and “only evidenced by its effects 
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(including material, linguistic and behavioural ones)”. She argued firmly against any 
crossover between clinical practice and social science, insisting that “researchers untrained 
in analysis cannot discern unconscious effects” (ibid. 544) pertaining to individual subjects.  
I take issue with this position for two reasons, and in so doing I argue that 
psychoanalysis provides resources for researchers to work reflexively with traces of 
unconscious communication. First, we should, I think, be wary of claims that endow any 
professional training with the kind of mystique that renders it wholly inaccessible to anyone 
other than those with many years of training. More specifically I argue that Thomas is wrong 
to imply that the capacity for “non-linguistic ‘listening’” (ibid. 543) necessarily requires 
extensive professional training (as I have previously argued: Bondi 2003a, 2005a). Instead, 
and without in any sense attempting to “psychoanalyse” research participants, I seek to show 
how psychoanalytic ideas can be used to support researchers to make sense of at least 
some unconscious communications that occur in ordinary ways in and around research 
interviews. Additionally, in order to allay fears about unwittingly overstepping boundaries 
between research and clinical practice, I also seek to clarify differences between the uses 
clinicians and researchers might make of such communications. To do so I draw on my own 
hybrid position: I am both a social researcher and a professionally-qualified counsellor who 
uses psychoanalytic ideas in my small, part-time practice.  
Secondly, Thomas’s argument relies on an understanding of knowledge as linguistic, 
cognitive and rational. This is a highly contestable view, countered by much psychoanalytic 
theory as well as by non-representational geographers (for example Thrift and Dewsbury 
2000) and in discussions of emotional geographies (for example Smith et al. 2009). On these 
alternative accounts, knowing is much more wide-ranging than cognition, including such 
things as embodied awareness of movement and feelings. In this context a useful 
psychoanalytic concept is that of the “unthought known”, developed by Christopher Bollas 
(1987), which refers to that which is unconscious and not available to thought, but 
nevertheless “known” in the sense of registered somehow within a person’s being. For Bollas 
(1987, 282) “there is in each of us a fundamental split between what we think we know and 
what we know but may never be able to think”. Focusing on embodied knowledge, and 
addressing psychoanalysts, he has argued that: 
some analysands enable us to feel somatically rested and receptive, while others 
precipitate complex body tensions […] This is not a peculiarity of psychoanalysis, as 
in all our relations with people, we somatically register our sense of a person; we 
‘carry’ their effect on our psyche-soma, and this constitutes a form of somatic 
knowledge, which again is not thought (Bollas 1987, 282). 
On occasion, as I show below, it is possible to think about and make some sense of, such 
somatic registrations. 
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In responding to these three strands of scepticism about the methodological 
possibilities of psychoanalytic ideas, I have pointed to the relevance of a modified version of 
Pile’s (1991) psychoanalytic framing of research relationships enacted in interviews. I have 
argued that psychoanalysis makes available potentially useful resources for working with the 
unconscious communication of feeling, and that these can be deployed in ways that are 
sensitive to power dynamics. I have acknowledged the limitations of “transparent” self-
reflexivity and introduced the idea of knowledge that is embodied but unthought. In the 
remainder of this paper, I take forward these ideas through discussion of a particular 
interview.  
In the next section of the paper I briefly contextualise the interview I have selected for 
exploration. The four analytical sections that follow begin with an exploration of the 
negotiation of trust between me and my interviewee, which, I argue, took place largely 
through unconscious modes of communication. In this context I introduce the concept of the 
receptive unconscious. Having illustrated how transference communications may present 
themselves within interviews, in the next section I discuss key differences in appropriate 
responses to such communications within research and clinical settings. Thirdly, I offer a 
psychoanalytic reading of what happens when interviewers are moved by the narrations to 
which they listen, drawing on the concept of the counter-transference and briefly addressing 
debates about empathy. Lastly, I illustrate and explore the embodied communication of 
feelings, making use of the psychoanalytic concept of projective identification. In illustrating 
different aspects of unconscious communication within and around interview encounters, I 
suggest that psychoanalytic engagement can serve as a form of critical reflexivity well-
attuned to understanding felt experience. 
 
Interviewing Katherine 
The interview on which I draw was one of a series conducted with people who had recently 
embarked on counselling or counselling skills training courses. The wider research project 
explored the meanings of counselling work with a specific focus on counselling in the 
voluntary sector (Bondi 2003c, 2004, 2005b; Bondi with Fewell 2003, Bondi, Fewell and 
Kirkwood 2003). The interviews invited research participants to narrate stories about 
themselves in relation to three broad themes concerned with their pathways to training, their 
sense of what in their lives and in their personalities underlay their interest in counselling, 
and what counselling meant to them personally.  
The particular interview I have selected was conducted with a woman I call Katherine. 
At the time I felt it to be an ordinarily positive and successful interview in which Katherine had 
offered a powerful and moving story about herself. She had volunteered to take part in the 
interview in response to information that had reached her through a training course on which 
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she had recently embarked, paid for by her employer. Katherine was a few years older than 
me, white, and spoke with a strong regional working-class accent, her voice deep and husky, 
probably from decades of smoking cigarettes, the odour of which hung in the air of the office 
where she worked and in which the interview was conducted (prior to the introduction of 
legislation that now bans smoking in indoor workplaces). After supplementing the information 
Katherine had already received about the project, explaining the purpose of the interview, 
inviting her to ask questions and completing consent forms, I repeated the themes I was 
interested in exploring with her and turned on the audio-recorder. We talked for about an 
hour and a half, in accordance with the time-frame I had set out in the information provided to 
her. 
After the interview the audio-recording was passed to a professional transcriber. A 
few weeks later, I checked the transcript against the original recording and had a peculiar 
experience, which I explore below, of what I felt to be a discrepancy between my memory of 
the interview and what I heard on the recording. It was this sense of a discrepancy that drew 
me to revisit the interview once again for this paper.  
In the discussion that follows I offer and explore examples of unconscious 
communication between interviewer and interviewee. As I show, these communications can 
be discerned from their effects and to do so does not mean claiming to know anything my 
interviewee did not know. However, I also argue that unconscious communication is an 
important way in which emotions are communicated inter-subjectively in the ordinary (and 
sometimes extraordinary) relational interplay between the members of what Rosemary Rizq 
(2008) calls the “research couple”.  
 
Establishing trust: unconscious communication, the receptive unconscious and 
“rapport” 
In this section I describe how my interview with Katherine began and how it might be 
understood in terms of processes of unconscious communication in which feelings around 
trust were mobilised. I argue that these are central to what is often called the building of 
“rapport” and, in order to conceptualise rapport psychoanalytically, I introduce the concept of 
the receptive unconscious. 
During the first 15 to 20 minutes of the interview, Katherine explained how she had 
been prompted to embark on a counselling course because of experiences in her current job 
as an information and advice worker. In this job she found herself listening to people talk 
about all kinds of problems for which she had no practical information or advice to give. She 
said that one of the key reasons for embarking on the training was because, in responding to 
these people, “basically I just didn’t want to do anybody any harm”. She repeated this 
concern about the risk of harming someone several times, and also repeated her view that 
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counsellors “don’t give advice to people”. I listened, interposing a couple of brief questions 
about how she found out about courses and chose the one she was doing. My listening took 
an active and attentive form (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) in which my presence in the 
narrative is evident in the transcript in non-verbal utterances that let Katherine know I was 
following her, plus a few brief reflective and affirmative comments in which I offered back to 
Katherine what I thought she had said. For example, at one point, I said 
you were listening to people and you weren’t giving them advice, you were just 
letting them talk. But you knew that you wanted -; well you were a bit concerned that 
you -; about whether you might do somebody harm. 
I offered this summary to Katherine in order to convey to her what I understood her to be 
saying, and implicitly offering her the opportunity to correct me if she wished. At the time I 
was also faintly aware of a link between what Katherine was saying about counselling and 
how I was performing the role of interviewer: I was not giving Katherine advice or making 
judgements, but inviting her to talk with a minimum of direct questions.  
When I began to think about the transcript methodologically, I became aware that 
Katherine’s anxious refrain about not wanting to do anyone any harm, which she addressed 
to herself in relation to others, might also be understood as unconsciously addressed to me 
on behalf of herself. In other words, at the same time and as well as the manifest meaning of 
her motivation for seeking counselling training, perhaps she was also signalling an anxiety 
about whether I might do her harm through my conduct in this interview. Put another way, 
might she have been addressing a question about my trustworthiness? It is also inevitably 
the case that my noticing of Katherine’s repeated expression of concern about doing harm 
expresses something about me, including, perhaps, my own anxiety about doing harm to her. 
If feelings are understood to be relational then they do not belong uniquely to one person but 
are inspired in and through relationships. Without denying such entanglements, however, I 
want to consider how Katherine’s refrain might be thought about psychoanalytically. My 
proposition that questions about my trustworthiness might have been signalled in this refrain 
draws on two related psychoanalytic ideas. The first is that all speech carries multiple layers 
of meaning, hence the notion that we always say more than we (consciously) mean, or that 
there is always an “excess”, which is often affectively freighted. The second is the idea of 
unconscious transference, according to which statements about or addressed to others may 
simultaneously be statements made on behalf of the speaker and addressed to whoever is 
there to hear. I return to the second point in the next section but focus here on the 
unconscious communication of more-than-conscious meanings. 
The possibility that an additional, unconscious, meaning of Katherine’s refrain about 
not wanting to do anyone any harm was an expression of a question she had about whether 
or not I might harm her fitted with my experience of the trajectory of the interview. After the 
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opening phase of 15 to 20 minutes, in which Katherine spoke of her work-related reasons for 
embarking on a counselling course, she moved into a deeply personal autobiographical 
story. Within a few minutes of beginning to tell me about her childhood, she observed “God, 
it’s years since I’ve talked about this stuff”, before moving straight on with her account. In this 
interjection and in the manner of her ensuing narration, Katherine conveyed to me that she 
had not consciously planned what she would tell me but that this entire phase of the 
interview unfolded spontaneously. 
I explore the process of transition from the first phase to the second later in this 
paper, but at this point note that Katherine’s willingness to open up in this way is likely to be 
recognised by qualitative researchers as demonstrating the successful establishment of trust 
or “rapport”. In a recent textbook on interviewing, Nigel King and Christine Horrocks (2010, 
48) have noted that:  
building rapport with your participant is widely seen as a key ingredient in successful 
qualitative interviewing […]. Rapport is essentially about trust – enabling the 
participant to feel comfortable in opening up to you. There are no guaranteed 
recipes for rapport … 
The trajectory of the interview indicated that trust was indeed established and appeared to 
enable Katherine to tell a deeply personal story. My experience in the interview was that 
Katherine had used the first 15 or 20 minutes to “check out” whether or not I was someone 
she could trust sufficiently to share with me more personal material. But what (if anything) did 
I actually do to build rapport beyond listening attentively?  
Although I am an experienced interviewer, and a teacher of interviewing skills, not 
everyone I interview chooses to open up to me in the way that Katherine did. One way of 
understanding elusive differences between different interview encounters, is in terms of an 
unconscious dimension of two-way communication. If I am correct that Katherine’s repeated 
reference to not wanting to do harm to others was, in part, an unconscious communication 
addressed to me about the possibility that I might do her harm, then what happened during 
the first phase of the interview can be understood as a period in which she tested out her 
sense of my trustworthiness unconsciously. As I have already said, during the interview itself 
I did not consciously think about this meaning of her phrase and I did not say anything 
designed to assuage her concerns, for example by reassuring her that I meant her no harm 
or wouldn’t do her any harm. However, the fact that my later interpretation of her words as an 
unconscious communication made sense to me in relation to the trajectory of the interview, 
suggests that at an unconscious level something did register. In Bollas’s (1987) terms, that 
“something” was unthought, but nevertheless “known”. 
In an essay about psychoanalytic technique, Freud (1912/2002, 37) advised the 
analyst to 
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orientate his own unconscious, as a kind of receptive organ, towards the 
communicative unconscious of the patient, attuning himself to the analysand as the 
receiver of a telephone is attuned to the disc. 
Through training and practice, clinicians aim to develop and refine their sensitivity to such 
communications, thereby become adept at “orienting” their own unconscious in the way 
Freud described. They also develop skills in utilising unconscious communications 
therapeutically. But even in the absence of such training and practice, unconscious 
communications are happening all the time. Thus, one way of understanding the largely non-
verbal, out-of-awareness, process of building trust or rapport is in terms of the “transmission” 
and “reception” of unconscious “messages”. On this account, in my interview with Katherine, 
several messages were transmitted and received unconsciously. As well as Katherine’s 
words transmitting something more than she said, I received her latent meaning 
unconsciously. This unconscious reception was not sufficient: if Katherine unconsciously 
harboured doubts about my trustworthiness, something more must have happened to lead to 
Katherine’s apparent decision to open up. Although I did not respond consciously or overtly 
to Katherine’s concern about harm as if it was addressed to me, if I am correct about the 
latent meaning of her refrain, then it would appear that I did communicate something to her 
that put her at her ease. This was not in the content of my words but may have been in my 
tone, my manner, my style of listening. If, as psychoanalytic theory presumes, the 
unconscious is ever-present then surely this communication was unconscious too. So not 
only did I unconsciously receive Katherine’s unconscious communications, but, in the terms 
of Freud’s metaphor of telephony, I unconsciously “transmitted” back to her something that 
she could “receive” unconsciously (compare Campbell and Pile 2010; Pile 2012). These 
messages, I would argue, were saturated with (largely wordless) emotion: they related to 
how we felt in relation to one another, how we each sensed ourselves to be in the presence 
of, and affected by, the other. 
King and Horrocks (2010), like other qualitative researchers, have no “recipe” for 
rapport. It is presented as involving skills that require practice to develop, but also as 
exceeding good practice guidance (Roulston, deMarrais and Lewis 2003). This suggests that 
despite the lack of explicit reference to unconscious aspects of communication in the 
interviewing literature, trust and rapport are implicitly understood to require unconscious 
negotiation, exemplifying Kingsbury’s argument about the unacknowledged influence of 
psychoanalysis. Investigating the concept of rapport historically, Pile (2010a) has recently 
traced it to fore-runners of Freud, including the German physician and vitalist Franz Anton 
Mesmer and the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot, emphasising its origins in theories 
of unconscious communication, as well as seeking to unsettle some of the assumptions 
made about it by researchers. Whereas Pile’s historical analysis draws on examples from 
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clinical settings, the “rapport” that developed between Katherine and myself took place in her 
work-place in the context of a one-off research interview. 
The character of the unconscious I have mobilised to explore this example of 
unconscious communication is rather different from the disruptive, “untameable”, intransigent 
form emphasised by Felicity Callard (2003) and Mary Thomas (2007). However as Freud 
developed his theory of the unconscious, its forms seemed to proliferate: 
We now realize that the Ucs [unconscious] and the repressed are not coterminous; 
while it remains correct to say that all of the repressed is Ucs, it is not also the case 
that all of the Ucs is repressed. Part of the ego […] is undoubtedly Ucs. (Freud 
1923/2003, 109). 
Picking up on this, Bollas (2007, 27) has argued that  
our minds are far too complex [for the unconscious] to be about any one thing, be it a 
repressed idea, an id derivative, the transference, or anything. Indeed, at any one 
moment in psychic time, if we could have a look at the unconscious symphony it 
would be a vast network of creative combinations. 
In Bollas’s (ibid. 28) unconscious symphony, Freud’s telephone metaphor is “a theory of the 
receptive unconscious”. It is this receptive unconscious to which I have appealed in the 
example of the unconscious communication through which, during the first phase of our 
interview, we negotiated sufficient trust for Katherine’s deeply personal and spontaneous 
autobiographical narration to proceed. 
In drawing attention to the “receptive unconscious” I am not seeking to negate the 
importance of the repressed unconscious within interview encounters (Hollway and Jefferson 
2000) and the narratives they produce (Thomas 2007). However, I am suggesting that 
qualitative researchers, including those interested in emotional geographies, might find this 
concept of the “receptive unconscious” helpful in order to understand elusive, but deeply felt 
processes such as the development of trust or rapport. In this discussion I have focussed on 
one specific unconscious communication, but close attention to the audio-recording and the 
transcript yield many more, another of which I explore later in this paper. 
 
Unconscious transference communications in research and clinical practice 
As I have noted, my interpretation of Katherine’s repeated reference to the risk of harm as, in 
part, an unconscious communication addressed to me draws on the idea of the transference. 
Transference interpretations are a well-known staple of psychoanalytic practice, which 
respond to transference communications by making links between the analysands’ past 
relationships, their current lives outside analysis and what takes place in their relationships 
with their clinicians. In this section, I explore Katherine’s refrain further to clarify the different 
ways in which researchers and clinicians work with unconscious communications.  
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The transference meaning of Katherine’s refrain became consciously available to me 
only after the interview so I did not consciously think about it or respond explicitly to it while I 
was with her. However my formulation could be construed psychoanalytically as a partial 
transference interpretation in which I took her explicit meaning, which referred to her life in 
the present but away from the scene of our conversation, and hypothesised that it might 
have another meaning related directly to our relationship within the interview. Had this come 
into my mind during the interview itself and had I decided to voice it, I might have put it into 
words by saying to her something like “maybe you are concerned that I could do you harm if I 
don’t listen carefully enough”.  
I use the term “partial transference interpretation” to differentiate this kind of 
(hypothetical) response from one that also makes connections to the speaker’s past, 
especially their early relationships with parental figures. On Patrick Casement’s (1985, 44) 
account, a “full” transference interpretation brings together three elements, namely the “here 
and now” relationship between clinician and analysand, the “there and then” history of the 
analysand’s patterns of relating and “there and now” concerns in the analysand’s life outside 
the clinical setting. Saying to Katherine “maybe you are concerned that I could do you harm if 
I don’t listen carefully enough” refers only to the “here and now” relationship. However 
Katherine’s “there and now” concerns are also engaged in the implicit link to her concern 
about harming others.  To illustrate what a full transference interpretation might look like, had 
I been in possession of sufficient information, I could, hypothetically, have added to the 
statement “maybe you are concerned that I could do you harm if I don’t listen carefully 
enough” something along the lines of “as you have felt harmed by X before”.  
Are statements of this kind appropriate within a research setting? Reflecting on his 
relationships with research interviewees, Pile (1991) described some taking on a friend-to-
friend quality while others were more cross-generational and more akin to a step-son to step-
father relationship. He suggested that “it might have been possible to see how these […] 
transferences affected what went on in each interview by talking about it” (Pile 1991, 465). In 
other words, he seemed to advocate making full use of opportunities to interpret and explore 
transferential dimensions of research relationships during the course of interviews. Others 
have been more cautious. For example Thomas (2007) has insisted that researchers cannot 
possibly gather sufficient information in one-off or even repeat interviews to interpret the 
transference. Clinicians would tend to agree with her. For example, Casement (1985, 44) has 
written “it may take several sessions or even weeks before a full transference interpretation 
can be convincingly offered to a patient, whether based on a dream or other communication”. 
The qualifier “convincingly” is important, and in this context Bollas’s (1987) concepts of the 
receptive unconscious and the unthought known are again relevant. On his account, the 
development of a transference interpretation takes place through the unconscious 
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communications between analyst and analysand within the analytic setting, in which the 
unconscious receptivity of the analyst is central: 
It will be many months after greeting a new patient before I have some ‘sense’ of the 
person’s private and unconscious use of me as an object within the field of 
transference. […] Our psychoanalytic understanding of the transference has always 
been that this psychological phenomenon is a re-living in the analytic process of 
earlier states of being and experiencing. But I wonder now if this is strictly true […] In 
his discovery of psychoanalysis Freud created a situation […] in which the individual 
could live through for the first time elements of psychic life that have not previously 
been thought. 
Such a view of the transferences holds that it is not merely a reliving […] but a 
fundamentally new experience, in that ‘something’ is given a certain dosage of time, 
space and attentiveness in which to emerge. (Bollas, 1987, 277-8) 
For Bollas, therefore, a transference interpretation must have been “lived” within the 
unconscious experience of those between whom it is transacted. Only through this kind of 
“living an experience together” (Winnicott 1945/1958, 152) is there any possibility that an 
unthought known might become something it is possible to think about consciously. 
It follows from this that, whether or not it oversteps a boundary between research and 
clinical practice, offering something that looks like a partial or full transference interpretation 
to a research interviewee is problematic because it is unlikely to have been “lived” in the 
unconscious communication between researcher and research participants. It would not 
therefore actually constitute a transference interpretation in the sense that Bollas means. 
Thus, while Thomas (2007,543) has argued against attempting to “psychoanalyze our 
research subjects” as individuals, I am arguing that it is not even possible to do so, at least in 
relation to the transference, because such psychoanalytic work can only be done by 
unconsciously “living an experience together”. 
In this context it is important to note that research interviews do offer what Maxine 
Birch and Tina Miller (2000) have called “therapeutic opportunities” in the sense that 
participants may in some way feel better for talking to a researcher who is deeply interested 
in some aspect of their lives and perhaps especially their emotional lives. Elsewhere I have 
argued that we should not be surprised by this, and that psychotherapy has nothing like a 
monopoly on the therapeutic (Bondi 2013, also see Clark 2010). However the fact that 
research interviews may be experienced as therapeutic opportunities does not mean that any 
therapeutic effects they have come about in the same (or even similar) way as those arising 
in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy. 
If making statements that connect the interviewee’s past (“there and then”) and/or 
present (“there and now”) with the “here and now” of the interviewer-interviewee relationship 
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do not constitute transference interpretations in the sense of having been unconsciously lived 
together, the question remains for researchers as to whether they are appropriate to offer. I 
would argue, against Pile (1991), that in most circumstances they are not appropriate. There 
are two reasons for this view concerned with the context of the interview and the stated 
purpose of the interview. With respect to context, widespread cultural representations (and 
misrepresentations) of psychotherapy matter and interviewers need to be alert to the 
possibility that the kind of links I have described may be recognised by those we interview as 
having an affinity with therapeutic settings. Consequently they may generate confusion even 
if they do not, strictly speaking, blur a boundary between research and therapeutic settings. 
With respect to the latter, unless researchers have explicitly contracted with those they 
interview to reflect on the research relationships into which they enter, the researchers would 
surely be going beyond their remit if they were to do so. 
To clarify this further, in my interview with Katherine, during her autobiographical 
narration, I offered occasional comments that made links between the past and the present 
as she presented them. For example, at one point I remarked on how she had told me that 
she hadn’t felt that she fitted in when she was growing up and often continued to feel that 
now: “going back to early on about not fitting in […] you’ve gone on feeling like an outsider?” 
Such interventions bear some similarity to the links that might be offered in a therapeutic 
setting. However, since the interview explicitly asked for a conversation about how 
Katherine’s wider life experiences might have had a bearing on her recent decision to 
embark on a counselling course, they were directly relevant to the stated purpose. Moreover, 
because such links did not refer to the “here and now” relationship, they did not take the form 
of transference interpretations. By contrast, to bring in the “here and now” by suggesting that 
her anxiety about doing harm to others might have also expressed a concern about whether I 
might do her harm, would be of a different order. Given the purpose of the interview, to have 
sought reflection on the “here and now” relationship might have constituted a breach of trust 
that would have undermined rather than supported the process of building rapport in which 
we were unconsciously engaged.  
In summary, the unconscious processes with which clinicians work necessarily 
pervade research encounters. Researchers cannot help but be embroiled in unconscious 
work, including unconscious transference relationships, with research participants. In so far 
as we make conscious decisions about how to respond to unconscious communications, 
including transference communications, I have argued that we need to (a) be aware of the 
risks of creating unnecessary confusion for our participants (b) remain true to the explicit, 
contracted purpose of our research encounters, and (c) be content to trust the work 
undertaken through the receptive unconscious.  
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On being moved: counter-transference and empathy 
As I have indicated, the main phase of my interview with Katherine consisted of a rich and 
complex autobiographical account of her life. I found her account deeply moving and I was 
sometimes very close to tears. So was she: I could see the tears well up in her eyes and 
sometimes they spilled over. I felt at ease with my tears and with hers because it seemed to 
me that they matched the sadness of the story she told. I felt that she communicated to me 
important features of the emotional texture of her narration told, and that I understood her 
well enough to bear witness to its feeling content. But how? 
The outward facts of our life stories had little in common. Katherine grew up in a poor 
working class community in a large city with a long history of socio-economic adversity. She 
left school with minimal qualifications, had a baby in her early 20s and had since worked in 
unskilled manual and low-grade clerical jobs before moving to her current post. Born a few 
years after Katherine, I was raised in a middle-class household in an affluent commuter town 
in a much more prosperous region. Via a university education, I had moved into professional 
employment and did not have any children. While we were of similar ages, and shared 
gender, nationality and (white) racial positionings, our life experiences had been very 
different. My capacity to understand the feelings she sought to convey did not come from 
similar circumstances or other experiences we had in common. And yet I seemed to feel – 
embody – something of the emotional quality of the story Katherine narrated to the point of 
mirroring her tearfulness.  
This sense by an interviewer of “feeling with” an interviewee is often described as 
empathy and tends to be positively valorised in qualitative interviewing (Fontana and Frey 
2000; Kvale 2006). In the context of this valorisation, I have elsewhere described empathy as 
“a process in which one person imaginatively enters the experiential world of another” (Bondi 
2003a, 71). This version of empathy has been subject to criticism for being idealistic and 
simplistic in promoting the idea that anyone can ever “step into another’s shoes and see the 
world from that person’s perspective” (Jurecic 2006, 3; also see Evans 2012). This has 
prompted Cate Watson (2009) to argue that “empathic understanding in qualitative research 
runs the risk of becoming a form of colonization of the other as the object of research”. While 
I would concur that this conceptualisation of empathy is deeply problematic, it is not the only 
understanding of empathy available. Although I accept that my own description quoted above 
is flawed, I would still defend the argument in which it was embedded, in which I 
differentiated psychoanalytically between empathy and identification (Bondi 2003a). On that 
account, the risk of colonisation to which Cate Watson referred arises from processes of 
identification, which, I continue to argue, are related to, but insufficient for, empathy.  
Criticisms of empathy tend to equate it with identification, which does indeed risk 
colonising or erasing the other by assuming that my feelings as interviewer correspond 
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directly to the feelings of the interviewee. However, the conceptualisation of empathy I prefer 
is one in which unconscious processes of identification, such as projection and introjection, 
are necessary but not sufficient. What is also required is an ongoing sense of the alterity of 
the other, which is not available in identification. The capacity to use projection and 
introjection while retaining this sense of alterity draws on what Ronald Britton (2004) has 
called the “third position”. This “third position” is an unconscious process (not a fixed 
position) in which one is not only a subjectively engaged participant in a two-person 
relationship but also an observer of that relationship. This third position as process is intrinsic 
to the possibility of self-reflexivity in which the self’s relation to its self is both experienced 
and observed. Unconsciously it also allows us to move between being subjectively absorbed 
in an interviewee’s narrative as well as maintaining the capacity to “step back” from that 
absorption (Bondi 2013). On this account, empathy does not generate direct or perfect 
apprehension of the subjective experience of another. Rather it requires effort and is always 
imperfect and faltering. However much of the experience of the other is accurately 
recognised, empathy also entails acknowledging that the effort to understand can only ever 
yield an imperfect grasp of what the other feels (compare Jurecic 2006). In my interview with 
Katherine I did not at any point say anything like “I know what you mean” or “I understand 
how you must have felt”. Such formulations are emblematic of identification and risk the kind 
of erasure to which critics of empathy are alert. I would argue that they are not, in fact, 
empathic on the definition of empathy for which I have argued because they fail to 
acknowledge the limits of the speaker’s understanding. My empathic responses to Katherine 
were much more tentative because I remained aware that any understanding I had was 
limited and partial. 
Conceptualised in the terms for which I have argued, empathy is part of the counter-
transference. In a classic statement, Paula Heimann (1950, 81) defined the counter-
transference as “cover[ing] all the feelings the analyst experiences towards his [or her] 
patient” and as “an instrument of research into the patient’s unconscious”. She argued that a 
key purpose of a training analysis was not to render the analyst immune from feelings but “to 
enable him [or her] to sustain the feelings that are stirred in him [or her], as opposed to 
discharging them (as does the patient), in order to subordinate them to the analytic task” 
(Heimann 1950, 82, original emphasis). When the feelings stirred in the analyst are similar to 
those of the patient, contained (rather than discharged) and thought about (subordinated) in 
relation to the analytic task, they can be described as empathic (Bolognini 2003).  
Interviewers may not have the experience of a training analysis but they nevertheless 
do something broadly similar, although differently framed. The interview provides an 
opportunity for the interviewee to talk about and otherwise convey aspects of his or her 
experience and in so doing to “discharge” his or her feelings, whereas the role of the 
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interviewer is to contribute to the conversation with the purpose of supporting the 
interviewee’s narration. Even when interviewers contribute examples from their own lives, 
which is sometimes promoted in the interests of mutuality, such contributions are necessarily 
framed by their position: a personal story told by an interviewer plays a different part in an 
interview from a story told by an interviewee (Avis 2002; Goodrum and Keys 2007). In 
Heimann’s language, the thoughts and feelings of the interviewer are not, therefore, 
“discharged” in the interaction of the interviewer in the same way as those of interviewees. 
However, if the interviewer’s thoughts and feelings are “sustained” rather than obliterated, 
they may be useful in deepening the understanding of the interviewee’s subjective 
experience. This idea is consistent with a number of discussions of the emotional experience 
of fieldwork that have argued for researchers’ feelings to be thought of as data (for example 
Bennett 2009; Bondi 2005a; Evans 2012; Kleinman and Copp 1993; Meth with Malaza 2003; 
Wilkins 1993). I develop it further in the next section. 
 
Lost (for) words: embodied communication of feelings through projective 
identification 
The psychoanalytic concept of the counter-transference can help researchers think about the 
meanings of their own feelings in relation to the stories told by their interviewees. This is 
especially the case in relation to impacts that register primarily through their somatic effects 
on researchers, which, in psychoanalytic parlance, are often understood in terms of 
projective identification, in which the unconscious feelings originating in one person are 
projected into and felt by a recipient (Klein 1946/1991; also see Bollas 1987; Bondi 2003a; 
Casement 1985). Such effects may go unnoticed but when they are noticed, they are often 
troubling, demanding attention and yet also inexplicable, impacting on us bodily and yet 
somehow also interfering with our capacity to think. They provide us with evidence of the 
disruptive character of the unconscious. However, if they can be worked with, they can 
provide invaluable resources with which to approach the task of understanding the feelings of 
others. 
In what follows I illustrate qualities of such unconscious somatic effects, and the 
sense I eventually made of them, by exploring a chain of events in my non-cognitive, somatic 
experience of my interview with Katherine, connected to the transition from the first phase in 
which trust was being established to the second in which Katherine’s autobiographical 
narration unfolded. What was said as we entered this transition is shown in extract 1. 
Extract 1 
1 
2 
Liz: Yes. So it was really, it was your work here that led you onto 
the course? 
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3 Katherine: Yeah. 
4 
5 
6 
Liz: And I’m wondering if we could take it back a step and, and 
what led you into the kind of work that you’re doing here? 
7 
8 
Katherine: (Laughing) My whole life must have been chance. It was 
definitely just chance.  
Katherine then spoke briefly about leaving a previous job and coming to her current post. My 
next intervention was spoken rather softly, gently and falteringly, with the interaction 
proceeding as shown in extract 2. 
Extract 2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Liz: Well I’m wondering actually, as you said that, em, you just, 
you know, you don’t plan to do things, they just happen, well I 
wonder if we could actually go back to the, go back to the 
beginning about you? 
5 Katherine: About you? 
6 Liz: Yeah, and so, where are you from originally? 
7 
8 
9 
Katherine: Originally I was born in X, which is a very poor area of Y, just 
off Z. Do we want all the nitty gritty stuff, do we want all sort 
of/ 
10 
11 
Liz: What would you like to tell me; what do you think’s important? 
12 Katherine: On reflection what do I think’s important? 
13 Liz: Mmm [the question seemed to be to herself not to me]  
14  [Long pause lasting several seconds] 
15 Katherine: I was born in X …… 
Katherine then proceeded with her autobiographical account without further verbal prompting 
from me. 
During this transition phase, I was a little surprised to hear myself invite Katherine to 
“go back to the beginning” (extract 2, line 4). I was aware at the time that this wasn’t a 
phrasing I usually used and that I found myself saying it without thinking about what I was 
about to say. This made the moment memorable and all the more so since Katherine did 
indeed “go back to the beginning” and tell me of the circumstances of her birth. However, 
when, some weeks later, I checked the transcript (produced by a professional transcriber and 
as presented above) against the audio-recording, I couldn’t find my request that she “go back 
to the beginning”. I repeatedly and somewhat frantically replayed a segment of the tape that 
included the long pause noted on extract 2 line 14, searching for the words there, and I 
completely failed to see the words where they actually were (extract 2, line 4).  
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After checking the transcript, I did not listen to the audio-recording again until I began to 
prepare a presentation that eventually gave rise to this paper. Having searched in vain for 
what, at the time, I felt to be missing words, I created a story, shared with colleagues, to fit 
what had become “the facts” in my mind. I said that I must have imagined saying those 
words rather than actually saying them and that in the intensity of my focus on Katherine’s 
story-telling something telepathic might have happened (Pile 2012). This experience was 
why I was drawn to work with this particular interview later in order to explore it 
methodologically. Discovering that the words were actually on the audio-recording, albeit 
slightly earlier than I had remembered, came as a shock and undermined the story I had 
constructed about this interview. There were, therefore, at least four distinct elements of my 
counter-transference experience. 
1) In the interview I heard myself say something I wasn’t expecting and that surprised me. 
2) When I listened to the audio-recording to check the transcript I had a powerful sense that 
I knew where the words should be, searched there compulsively and was perplexed by 
their absence. I was wholly unable to see or hear the words for which I was searching 
even though they were in fact in the transcript and on the audio-recording, and only a 
short “distance” away from the place in which I searched so intensively.  
3) In response to these elements of my experience I felt compelled to create a story and to 
seek colleagues to listen to that story. In retrospect that appears to have been another 
kind of frantic activity that covered over my more fundamental inability to make sense of 
what I felt. 
4) When I found the missing words in a different place, I was shocked and registered a 
strong flush of embarrassment as I realised that I had fabricated and circulated a story 
from what now looked like a foolish mistake. I also felt that I’d lost something else, 
namely the veracity of the story I’d constructed. 
As I have indicated, all these experiences were emotionally charged and I felt the charge 
somatically before I found words to describe them. How, if at all, did these feelings relate to 
Katherine’s narration?  
Some of the key facts of Katherine’s autobiography are as follows. She was the 
eldest of three siblings and, before the birth of her parents’ second child, she had been sent 
to live with her grandparents on a permanent basis. She was told that this was for the sake of 
her health. The grandparents stayed just a few streets away from her parents but in an area 
locally recognised as “better”. As Katherine grew up, she “wanted to be the same as [her] 
brother and sister” but never felt she fitted in, not belonging wholly with them or with her 
grandparents and their neighbours. As a teenager she got on well with her grandfather but 
fought with her grandmother. Her grandfather died when she was 19 and finally the truth was 
told: her mother’s husband was not her biological father. The disclosure was presented to 
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Katherine in anger: she reported that grandmother “told me it was my fault that my mother 
had had such a miserable life because my dad threw me back in her face every time they 
fought”. At this moment, in the context of a significant bereavement, she “left and was thrown 
out” of her grandmother’s house and couldn’t go to her mother’s either, so went to stay with 
relatives in another city. She did not settle and a few months later returned to the city of her 
birth, initially staying uneasily with her grandmother. Within a few years, the man Katherine 
called her father died, by which time she was a lone parent with a one-year-old son. 
Determined not to repeat what had happened to her, she had not had a boyfriend since the 
birth of her child because she “wasn’t having any man tell him [her son] that he wasn’t his”. 
A profound sense of displacement and not fitting in was clearly evident in Katherine’s 
narration, along with a deep sense of loss and sadness. The sense I make of my felt 
experience does not change this interpretation of her story in any fundamental way. 
However, when I was finally able to think about my sensations without resorting to frantic 
activity, they deepened my understanding of Katherine’s feelings. Using the various elements 
of my experience counter-transferentially and reflexively in the service of the analytic task of 
comprehending emotional qualities of Katherine’s narration, the first point to make is that 
they serve to remind me of the limits of my empathic insight into Katherine’s felt experience. 
My capacity to bear witness to Katherine’s story seemed to require something to register in 
my being somatically, and then to make its presence felt when I returned to the audio-
recording on two subsequent occasions. Once I realised this and began to discuss my 
counter-transference experience with colleagues, I also remembered how, when I got home 
after the interview, I caught the whiff of tobacco smoke on my clothes and threw everything 
that I was wearing in the washing machine as well as swiftly washing my hair. There isn’t 
anything intrinsically notable about these acts, but my memory of them returned to me the 
powerful feeling that I had had to shake off or get rid of something after the interview, which, 
on the surface I felt had gone well (compare Parr 1998).  
Understood as an unconscious effect, the compulsion to be rid of that faint odour of 
cigarette smoke was perhaps a signal that my unconscious processing of this interview was 
far from over and more specifically that processes of projective identification were at work. A 
sense of compulsion was again very strong for me when I searched for words in what I later 
discovered to be the wrong place. However, I was not yet able to think about these somatic 
registrations in relation to Katherine’s narration: in Bollas’s (1987) terms, they were 
unthought knowns, which I continued to carry within me for years. Psychoanalytic 
understandings of unconscious life indicate that this happens all the time and the vast 
majority of these effects remain forever unthought. Sometimes, such effects demand 
attention while their unconscious meaning remains wholly unavailable to us, prompting, for 
example, fabrications such as the story I told about the misplaced words (compare Callard 
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2003). Unconscious processes can be deeply disruptive, and in this case my failure to see 
and hear the words I was looking for, and my frantic search for them, made no sense to me 
but drove me to construct a wholly erroneous story. When I finally realised my mistake, the 
hot flush of embarrassment I felt was accompanied by a momentary desire to deny (not 
know) what I had now discovered.  
Eventually, after returning to the audio-recording years later, I was able to think about 
what my body already knew, and to create “word pictures” for what I had felt earlier as well 
as what I felt in the present. It seemed as if I had registered what would turn out to be 
visceral reminders of feelings that Katherine had conveyed to me. Words I’d remembered 
saying but later searched for frantically and unsuccessfully, together with the story I created 
to “explain” their apparent absence, seemed to carry a faint echo of Katherine’s story, as if 
Katherine’s feeling of always being somehow out of place was communicated via my bodily 
experience. The story of telepathic communication I had fabricated because of my inability to 
see what was in plain sight, now prompted me to think again of how, for 19 years, Katherine 
had lived with the effects of a secret about her parentage from which she was excluded, and 
with a cover story that never really rang true. She had grown up with a profound sense of 
displacement, searching for a place to belong but never finding it. The shock of discovering 
that the words I had frantically searched for had in fact always been there, but in a slightly 
different place, also made me think again of the world of difference it made for Katherine to 
live those few streets away from her parents and siblings. I was also bodily reminded of the 
impact of the eventual disclosure of the long held secret about her parentage, massively 
shocking in itself and surely all the more so given that she had just lost her grandfather.  
Any sense I had of Katherine’s feelings at the time she told me of these events was 
somehow insufficient in relation to what she sought to convey. It may be that, consciously or 
unconsciously, she was trying to protect me from the emotional force of her story; it may be 
that I was unprepared to hear this dimension of what she was saying. Understood in terms of 
projective identification, I felt – somatically – unconscious affects that originated with 
Katherine but which she needed to “discharge”. Whatever the reason, an unconscious 
affective “excess” above and beyond the manifest content of our conversation, above and 
beyond my apparently good-enough empathic response, seemed to lodge in me, ready to 
return when I was able to begin to think about my feelings years later.  
I am not claiming that I ever truly understood how it felt for her, but I am suggesting 
that my understanding deepened as a result of the reminders that were generated by my 
somatic experience of working with the audio-recording. I am also suggesting that, when 
used alongside the explicit content of an interview, counter-transference experiences of this 
kind can be powerful ways in which we develop knowledge about another person’s feelings.  
 24 
In the end, the example on which I have focussed is unusual because researchers do 
not often get the opportunity to return to interviews so long after the event. However, if we 
are to use the counter-transference methodologically, it is important to be aware that much of 
what we register unconsciously may remain unavailable for thought, whether temporarily or 
permanently. Psychoanalytic consultation may be helpful in making some things available 
sooner rather than later. For example, Sue Jervis (2013) has described how, when 
participating in a psychoanalytic consultation group for researchers, she became 
unexpectedly upset. This distressing experience helped her make sense of an interview she 
had previously found inexplicably difficult to use. Her account conveys a sense of returning 
on multiple occasions to an interview, which she eventually realised she had been struggling 
to “digest”. In my own case, around the time I had interviewed Katherine, I was working on a 
paper in which I drew on stories offered by trainee counsellors to describe counselling as 
offering the promise of “resituating troubled selves” (Bondi 2003c, 866). I did not use 
Katherine’s account in that paper although it could have offered a graphic example. Perhaps 
one reason why I did not was that my thinking about it was still unconsciously too troubled for 
me to do so. 
 
Conclusion  
I opened this paper by asking how it is possible to know how another person feels and I have 
turned to psychoanalytic ideas for guidance, responding to a call issued by Pile (1991) more 
than twenty years ago. Following Kingsbury (2010, 519), I have acknowledged scepticism 
about the “value and viability” of methodological uses of psychoanalysis. In attending to 
some elements of this scepticism I have introduced the idea of the “unthought known”, the 
concept of the receptive unconscious and the potential for working with somatic knowledge. 
By attending to examples drawn from a single interview I have illustrated several forms of 
unconscious communication and explored how researchers might work with these.  
Psychoanalytic ideas about unconscious processes suggest that feelings are 
communicated easily enough and may be registered (“known”) by those to whom they are 
communicated. Indeed, the psychoanalytic concepts on which I have drawn presume that 
feelings arise and take shape relationally.  The challenge for researchers lies in the capacity 
to think about what we register and work from within our emotional entanglement with others. 
Moreover, because much communication happens outside of our conscious awareness, and 
because our affective boundaries are so permeable, there is ample scope for confusion 
about the relationship between our own bodily sensations and the feelings of others. My 
opening question might therefore be rephrased in terms of how it is possible to think about 
feelings in ways that help us understand other people’s emotional experience.  
 25 
In this paper, I have attempted to show that it is possible to think about unconscious 
communication and to illuminate some of the limits and the challenges entailed. I have 
echoed Kingsbury (2010) and Pile (2012) in arguing that qualitative researchers already use 
ideas like “rapport” that rely implicitly on psychoanalysis. Paying attention to an interviewee’s 
repetition of a particular concern, I have illustrated how unconscious “excess” may present 
itself in ways that are relatively straightforward and uncontentious to trace using the idea of 
the receptive unconscious. In so doing I have sought to show how researchers might utilise 
psychoanalytic ideas to help illuminate otherwise elusive but nevertheless ordinary features 
of the interactions that constitute interviews, like the variably successful unconscious 
negotiation of trust.  
In illustrating unconscious communication arising through speech, I have drawn on 
the idea of unconscious transference to recognise a latent meaning in a repeated phrase. I 
have explored in some detail differences between the uses researchers and clinicians might 
make of transference communications, considering specifically the case of transference 
interpretations, which are a classic and distinctive element of clinical practice. While I have 
acknowledged that interviews may offer research participants “therapeutic opportunities” 
(Birch and Miller 2000), I have also endorsed those who caution against the active 
incorporation into interviews discussion of the “here and now” (transference) relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee. I have made this case on the grounds that it is 
important that researchers honour the stated purpose of the interviews for which they recruit 
participants, and because, in a “therapeutic culture” (Furedi 2004) discussion of the “here 
and now” relationship carries particular risks of causing confusion. However I have also 
suggested that the way clinicians work with the transference is through a process of 
unconsciously “living an experience together” (Winnicott 1945/1958, 152), which is simply not 
available to researchers (compare Thomas 2007).  
Sometimes, across all kinds of important differences, researchers feel moved by the 
accounts those they interview offer in ways that seem to mirror their interviewees’ feelings 
(Goodrum and Keys 2007). Such feelings carry risks, for example of effacing the other’s 
emotional experience by assuming it is the same as one’s own (Watson 2009) or of 
emotional exhaustion generated by over-identification with interviewees (Evans 2012). I have 
argued for a conceptualisation of empathy that draws on the psychoanalytic concept of a 
“third position” through which an awareness of alterity is retained alongside the emotional 
insights afforded by unconscious processes of identification. This sense of alterity keeps to 
the fore limits of understanding. When researchers feel like saying “I know just how you feel”, 
or find themselves bursting to share an example of their own, it is likely that unconscious 
identification (not empathy) holds sway. These are moments at which the relationships 
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between our own feelings and the feelings of the other need to be considered with 
particularly critical caution. 
In exploring a chain of events I experienced in relation to a particular interview, I have 
illustrated how unconscious effects that register somatically sometimes disrupt one’s 
capacity to think. Because I chose to revisit this interview some time after the event, I gained 
new perspective, which momentarily felt like a most unwelcome revelation, but which also 
enabled me to think about my experience as a product of projective identification in the 
counter-transference. I have shown how such thinking might help us to understanding the 
emotional “track” embedded and embodied in the narrations research participants offer. 
Katy Bennett (2009, 248) has commented that she “can see the potential for those 
with appropriate training to adopt practices developed in psychotherapy for the purposes of 
social science research” but that she is “less certain” how someone “like me, with no such 
training, can  […] approach such methods”. In this paper I have attempted to shed some light 
on how social science researchers already take some ideas about unconscious 
communication (and the receptive unconscious) for granted in concepts like “rapport”. I have 
also illustrated something of the variety of ways in which unconscious communication 
routinely occurs together with the potential such communications offer in our capacity to 
understand people’s feelings. In particular I have suggested that our somatic experience may 
be a crucial source in the development of such knowledge. I am not suggesting this is easy 
or something that can be done without drawing on the expertise of psychoanalytic 
consultants. That psychoanalysis should occupy a contradictory position in relation to social 
research is, perhaps, par for the course. 
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